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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:13 am
Time: 12:13 am
Results for extrajudicial killings
3 results foundAuthor: Erikson, Bryan Title: Crimes in Northern Burma: Results from a Fact-Finding Mission to Kachin State Summary: On 9 June 2011, civil war broke out in northern Burma between the Burma Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), ending a 17-year long ceasefire agreement. This report presents data collected from a Partners investigation in southern Kachin State, Burma in October 2011. The testimony of witnesses and on-site photographs reveal multiple acts perpetrated by Burma Army battalions 74 and 276 against ethnic Kachin civilians that potentially amount to war crimes and other extreme crimes. These acts include torture, extrajudicial killing, the specific targeting of civilians, human shielding, unlawful arrest, unlawful detention, forced labor, forced relocation, displacement, property theft and property destruction. Witnesses reported that Burma Army soldiers entered Nam Lim Pa village on 8 October 2011. Men were arrested and detained for forced labor. Women and children were detained in the Roman Catholic church compound against their will and without provocation or expressed reason. Violent injuries demonstrate signs of extreme physical abuse and strongly suggest the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering while in custody. Civilian casualties included torture and execution. Eyewitness reports indicate no Kachin Independence Army presence during the time of the attacks. Villagers were forcibly relocated and displaced by armed soldiers. Houses, offices and churches were robbed and vandalized, all without justification. At least one home was robbed and burned to the ground while its owner was arrested and detained. The results from this fact-finding mission to Kachin State reveal evidence of crimes that potentially amount to war crimes, perpetrated by the Burma Army against ethnic Kachin civilians and their properties in October 2011. Based on the incidents documented in this report, the Burma Army is in contravention of its legal obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. Considering the nature and scale of these acts in combination with documented abuses in the broader civil war in Kachin State, the actions of the Burma government and the Burma Army may also amount to other serious violations, including crimes against humanity. Those responsible must be brought to justice and held accountable for their actions. Partners makes the following key recommendations: To the Burma government and the Burma Army — Cease targeting civilians in the civil war in northern Burma and other ethnic areas, and respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law. — Permit independent, impartial, and credible investigations of human rights violations. — Develop a legal framework to investigate, prosecute and address allegations of abuse. — Allow United Nations and humanitarian agencies unfettered access to conflict-affected communities. To the International Community — Support a UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry into international crimes in Burma, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, as recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Tomas Ojea Quintana. — Engage the Burmese authorities on serious human rights violations occurring in the country with an emphasis on accountability. To UN agencies and the Donor Community — Support and coordinate activities with Burma-based and border-based humanitarian agencies working with conflict-affected communities. — Urge the Burma government to increase access to at-risk civilian populations and all populations of internally displaced persons. Details: Partner's Relief & Development, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://partnersworld.org/usa/images/stories/crimes_in_northern_burma/crimes_in_northern_burma.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Burma URL: http://partnersworld.org/usa/images/stories/crimes_in_northern_burma/crimes_in_northern_burma.pdf Shelf Number: 123596 Keywords: Extrajudicial KillingsHuman Rights (Burma)TortureViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Summary: Between 2002 and 2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed civilians. Under pressure from superiors to show "positive" results and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas, soldiers and officers abducted victims or lured them to remote locations under false pretenses - such as with promises of work - killed them, placed weapons on their lifeless bodies, and then reported them as enemy combatants killed in action. Committed on a large scale for more than half a decade, these "false positive" killings constitute one of the worst episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere in recent decades. In September 2008, a media scandal over army troops' killings of young men and teenage boys from the Bogota suburb of Soacha helped force the government to take serious measures to stop the crimes, including by dismissing three army generals. Prosecutors are now investigating more than 3,000 alleged false positives by military personnel. Upwards of 800 army members have been convicted for extrajudicial killings committed between 2002 and 2008, most of them low-ranking soldiers. The convictions have covered a handful of former battalion and other tactical unit commanders, but not a single officer who was commanding a brigade or holding a position higher up the chain of command at the time of the crimes. Of the 16 active and retired army generals under investigation, none have been charged. This report provides the most detailed published account to date of criminal investigations into many specific brigades and battalions responsible for large numbers of alleged false positive killings, lays out the now substantial evidence that senior army officers were responsible for many of the killings, and assesses the obstacles that so far have impeded such officers from being held accountable. The report is based on our extensive review of criminal case files, judicial rulings, and data on prosecutors' investigations into false positives; witness testimony, much of it previously unpublished; and our interviews with more than 40 prosecutors, witnesses, victims' family members, and lawyers, among others. Our analysis of the Attorney General's Office's work shows that prosecutors have identified more than 180 battalions and other tactical units, attached to 41 brigades, operating under all of the army's then-seven divisions, which allegedly committed extrajudicial killings between 2002 and 2008. The patterns in these cases strongly suggest that commanders in tactical units and brigades responsible for a significant number of cases at least knew or should have known about the wrongful killings, and therefore may be criminally liable as a matter of command responsibility. This report profiles 11 such brigades and many of the specific tactical units operating under them implicated in the killings. Some of the commanders of those 11 brigades subsequently rose to the top of the military command. For example, Attorney General's Office data shows prosecutors are investigating: - At least 44 alleged extrajudicial killings by 4th Brigade troops during the period retired General Mario Montoya commanded it. He became the armys top commander in 2006-2008; - At least 113 alleged extrajudicial killings by 4th Brigade troops during the period retired General Oscar Gonzalez Pena commanded it. He became the army's top commander in 2008-2010; - At least 28 alleged extrajudicial killings by 4th Brigade troops during the period General Juan Pablo Rodriguez Barragan commanded it. As the current commander of the armed forces, he is now Colombia's top military official, and oversees all three military branches, including the army; and - At least 48 alleged extrajudicial killings by 9th Brigade troops during the period General Jaime Lasprilla Villamizar commanded it. He is now the armys top commander. Human Rights Watch also identified witness testimony and prosecutor files naming three of these, as well as other, generals and colonels who allegedly knew of, or planned, ordered, or otherwise facilitated false positives. Their positions at the time of the crimes included battalion, brigade, and division commanders, as well as one head of the army. Indeed, the apparently widespread and systematic extrajudicial killings by troops attached to virtually all brigades in every single division across Colombia point to the conclusion that the highest levels of the army command at least should have known about the killings, and may have ordered or otherwise actively furthered their commission. Our research also shows that prosecutors pursuing false positive cases confront serious obstacles, ranging from military authorities' lack of cooperation with investigations, to threats and attacks on key witnesses. Furthermore, many cases remain in military courts. This undercuts accountability because military justice system personnel have historically failed to investigate the crimes, and continue to lack independence and credibility. There have also been shortcomings within the Attorney General's Office, including what some prosecutors describe as overwhelming caseloads. Moreover, cases from the same army unit are generally distributed among different prosecutors, which prevents them from conducting the kind of contextualized and systematic investigations necessary to identify high-ranking perpetrators. Attorney General's Office officials said they are in the process of adopting measures to remedy these internal problems. Seven years after the false positives scandal erupted, there is abundant evidence indicating that numerous senior army officers bear responsibility and it is imperative that the government do more to ensure they are held accountable. Important steps include ordering military authorities to cooperate with false positive investigations, assigning sufficient prosecutors to pursue them, protecting witnesses and their families, and making sure that any transitional justice legislation implemented as part of a peace agreement with guerrillas does not hinder accountability for the crimes. Bringing to justice those most responsible for one of the darkest chapters in Colombia's long war will not be easy, but it is entirely within the government's control to do so. Details: New York: HRW, 2015. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/colombia0615_4up.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/colombia0615_4up.pdf Shelf Number: 136001 Keywords: Extrajudicial KillingsHomicidesPolitical Corruption |
Author: Kreuzer, Peter Title: If they resist, kill them all: Police vigilantism in the Philippines Summary: In May of 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected President of the Philippines and inaugurated into office on June 30. During the election campaign he was already focusing on ridding the country of drug-related crime and indicated his willingness to tolerate, if not support, the killing of suspects by the police. After entering office, he officially launched a comprehensive campaign against drug-related crime that has since cost the lives of several thousand suspects. While anonymous vigilantes are responsible for a significant share, if not the majority of these extralegal killings, in four months the police killed more than 1,000 suspects in so-called "legitimate encounters" that were justified as actions carried out in self-defense. This report then looks at a vastly under-researched phenomenon: extrajudicial police vigilantism involving killings by on-duty police officers that are masked as "legitimate encounters" with criminals. It argues that, while the Philippines have a strong tradition of death-squad killings, this has been complemented for a long time by a practice of "social cleansing" that did not make it necessary for agents of the state to deny complicity: official police vigilantism. On the contrary, such vigilante killings could be utilized as evidence of a strong state. However, in the past such police vigilantism was a local phenomenon. This changed under the new president, who nationalized the local practice and thereby changed its dynamics. This report provides an overview of the pattern of killings of suspects by members of the Philippine National Police while on duty currently taking place. The main section of the report analyzes past patterns of “legitimate encounters” in a number of selected regions and provinces of the Philippines. The integration of these two datasets allows for a comparison not only among regions and provinces but also over time. Consideration of this quantitative data is complemented by sketches of the dynamics driving current reactions to the new policy in a number of provinces and cities. Going beyond the Philippines, this study also provides a comparative dataset on similar forms of deadly police violence for a small set of countries, regions and cities that permits a comparison of past and present Philippines practice. The detailed analysis shows that: • in most, but not all of the various case studies, there has been a long tradition of police-vigilantism, • regions, provinces and cities that have exhibited higher levels of police vigilantism in the past tend to react more strongly to the presidential campaign that legitimized extralegal killings under the pretext of a "legitimate encounter," • those cases with the highest levels of police vigilantism both now and in the past tend to be the most "developed" ones, fulfilling a metropolitan function at either a national or regional level, • there is no link between threats to the police and their willingness to kill suspects in "legitimate encounters," • prior to the present wave of extrajudicial killings, the magnitude of violent "legitimate encounters" was moderate, although they were carried out by clearly vigilante police forces targeting suspects, • while the patterns of "legitimate encounters" have not changed in the current campaign, the number of extra-legal killings has risen dramatically since the election of President Duterte, • Philippines police officers did not have to learn a new practice; they did not have to unlearn firmly established convictions about due process. They transformed an established but sparingly used practice into a key instrument for reducing crime and for strengthening institutions, • local leaders' reactions to the presidential campaign depend to a significant extent on the local leaders' past perceptions of utilizing the police as a force for "social cleansing" and the leaders’ current power base in the face of rising pressure to conform to the central leadership’s expectations. Going beyond empirical analysis of the data on past and present police vigilantism in the Philippines, I maintain that the present administration uses police vigilantism on the national level to simulate a strong state and thereby achieve widespread public acclaim and acquiescence. By establishing the Philippine National Police as his power base, the new president has within a few months successfully hollowed out democratic checks and balances and installed himself as the foremost “boss” at the national level. While forceful personalities are a regular feature of Philippines politics, their power is normally limited by other bosses who contend for power and wealth. Like Ferdinand Marcos before him, Rodrigo Duterte is well on his way to neutralizing this division of powers – the only one that works well in the Philippines during "normal" times. Currently, it seems that the Philippines are on a direct path toward a regime that may be likened to an electoral dictatorship, where a president, through the shrewd manipulation of public discourse and the resulting outstanding public support, and with the help of the national police, is succeeding in subjugating the various political families that make up the Philippines political elite. Details: Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2016. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIF Report No. 142 : Accessed February 1, 2017 at: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif142.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Philippines URL: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif142.pdf Shelf Number: 145096 Keywords: Deadly ForceDrug OffendersExtrajudicial KillingsPolice BrutalityPolice Use of ForcePolice ViolenceVigilantism |